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CROYLE v. CROYLE

majority of jurisdictions in which the question has been
raised. The second rule which was established by statute,
probably does not, in its present form, materially alter existing law; although, in other jurisdictions, it has become
the instrument which defeats any protection which minority stockholders can invoke against absolute domination by
the majority stockholders. For that reason, any extension
of the second rule is to be guarded against. The third rule
apparently alters existing law in spite of elaborate assurances by the legislature that it does not. The means by
which the prior law has been altered is almost certain to
bring into question the legality of the statute as applied
to existing corporations. Certainly the Maryland statute
embodies greater liberality in permitting gifts by corporations than similar statutes in other states both in respect
to the types of gifts authorized and the donees to whom
they may be made.
ALTERNATIVE REASONS FOR SETTING ASIDE
DIVORCE OBTAINED BY FRAUD
Croyle v. Croyle1
This is an original bill in equity whereby the plaintiff
first wife seeks to set aside, as having been obtained by
fraud, a decree for divorce a vinculo matrimonii which her
late husband had obtained against her in his lifetime in
the same court wherein this bill was filed. The defendant is the second wife of the late husband, who is sued
both in her individual capacity and as administratrix
of the decedent husband. The bill seeks, inter alia, a
declaration that the plaintiff, not the defendant, is the
"lawful widow" of the decedent.
The plaintiff and the late husband had been married
for thirty-three years and were living together in the District of Columbia when, because of his cruelty, they separated, and entered into a separation agreement under
which the husband was to make payments for the wife's
support. The wife continued to reside in the former home
in the District and the husband (supposedly) removed his
residence to Prince George's County, Maryland.
Subsequently, in Prince George's County, he filed
against the now plaintiff wife a suit for divorce a vinculo
matrimonii, alleging her desertion of him. While know' 40 A. (2d) 374 (Md. 1944).
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ing her actual whereabouts at their former home in the
District, he made no attempt actually to apprise her of
the pendency of the suit, and proceeded merely by order
of publication as against a non-resident, and caused notice
of the suit to be published in a Prince George's County
newspaper. As a result of this obscure notice, the now
plaintiff did not learn of the pendency of the suit until
well after its successful conclusion by a decree in his favor
for divorce.
Immediately upon learning of the Maryland divorce
decree, the now plaintiff instituted a proceeding in the
District of Columbia against the husband for a divorce a
mensa et thoro and to set aside the Maryland decree. The
husband appeared in that suit and thus became personally
subject to the jurisdiction of that court. After a lengthy
trial the court of the District awarded her a divorce a
mensa, made a finding that the Maryland divorce had been
awarded on fraudulent grounds, and awarded the now
plaintiff regular alimony, which the husband paid until
the time of his death. He did not appeal that case.
During the pendency of the District of Columbia proceeding, the husband married the now defendant and, in
fact, continued to live with her after the a mensa decree
and until the time of his death, when the now defendant
had herself appointed administratrix.
When the now plaintiff made claim for a pension as the
widow of a veteran, the Veteran's Bureau ruled that she
could not receive one until the Maryland decree of divorce
had been set aside. In order thus to obtain the pension
and, as well, to become entitled to the husband's other
property, the plaintiff first wife thereupon filed the instant
purpose of setting aside the Maryland decree
case for the
2
of divorce.
The Chancellor sustained the defendant's demurrer and
dismissed the bill without leave to amend, on the two
grounds that the bill did not set forth a cause entitling
to relief in equity, and that the plaintiff was barred by
laches and estoppel. On appeal the Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded and held the plaintiff to be entitled
to the relief and that laches provided no bar herein.
In all probability, inasmuch as the defendant was also the administratrix of the decedent husband in a Maryland proceeding, personal jurisdiction was obtained over the defendant for purposes of the principal case.
At least any objection was waived by her appearance and defenses on the
merits. Quaere: If it is not possible to obtain service of process on the
defendant in an original bill for fraud case, and if there be no voluntary
appearance, might the case be *brought by advertisement of an order of
publication under the usual procedure therefor?
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The Court found that the combination of his completely
false allegation that she had deserted him and his deliberate concealment of the pendency of the action from her
when it would have been most simple to have apprised
her of it sufficiently worked fraud in the obtention of the
divorce so as to entitle her to have it set aside. Furthermore, the Court disposed of the contention of laches by
pointing out that she had promptly proceeded in the District, under advice of counsel, to protect her rights immediately upon learning of the Maryland divorce, and that
the now defendant could not claim estoppel inasmuch as
she had never changed her position because she had married the husband with full knowledge of an attack on the
Maryland divorce.
It should be emphasized that the defect, if any, in the
original Maryland divorce, did not concern the lack of
necessary jurisdictional domicil on the part of the then
plaintiff husband. Thus the case has nothing to do with
the problem, recently brought into focus by the two Williams cases' in the Supreme Court of the United States, of
necessary jurisdictional domicil to entitle a divorce suit
to be brought in a jurisdiction into which the moving party
has recently come. In the instant case neither the District of Columbia Court nor the Maryland one put the defect of the divorce on lack of domicil.4 Rather it went to
fraud in the obtention, conceding the presence of bona
fide residence of the late husband in Prince George's
County at the time of the suit. It is perfectly plausible in
this case that the late husband did actually remove his
residence to Maryland, the while continuing to work in the
District. Thus he could have had necessary jurisdictional
domicil for the Maryland divorce and still have been subjected to process for personal jurisdiction in the first wife's
District of Columbia proceeding.
While conceding the correctness of the Court of Appeals' ruling on the merits of the principal case, i. e., that
3 Williams et al v. North Carolina, 63 S. Ct. 207 (U. S. 1942) ; and Ibid.,
65 S. Ct. 1092 (U. S. 1945). The former case is discussed in Strahorn
and Reiblich, The Haddock Case Overruled-The Future of Interstate
Divorce (1942) 7 Md. L. Rev. 29.
4 Consider the discussion in the text, infra, concerning the res adjudicata
effect of a finding of invalidity of a given divorce in the courts of another
state. Thus, if after the grant of a divorce by one state, the courts of
another state made a finding of non-recognition under the Williams
doctrine, based on a finding of lack of bona fide domicil in the granting
state, that decision should be res adjudicata on the parties thereto, even
in the courts of the granting state in any third proceeding wherein the
initial validity of the divorce might be attacked.
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there was sufficient fraud in the obtention of the divorce
to entitle it to be set aside on an original bill, yet this note
does not propose to go into that aspect of the problem.
Rather, it is proposed to pursue the thought that a proposition of law that the Court apparently overlooked entitled
it more easily to reach the same conclusion, in favor of
setting the divorce aside, without attacking the merits of
the problem whether the fraud was sufficiently serious
and whether laches were present.
The proposition is that, regardless whether the plaintiff
could make out sufficient fraud in the original obtention
in a contest thereabout in this case, the invalidity of the
Maryland divorce decree was already res adjudicata against
the late husband, and those claiming under him, including
the now defendant, because of the determination to that
effect in the earlier District of Columbia case in which the
late husband was subject to jurisdiction. If this be so,
then it follows that the Maryland courts, on an original
bill for fraud to set aside the divorce, should have granted
the relief merely upon the proper filing of a transcript
of the District proceedings, without inquiring into either
the facts or the law of the alleged fraud practiced on the
plaintiff first wife. Thus would necessary full faith and
credit be given to the District limited divorce, the granting of which implied a finding that the there plaintiff wife
was still a wife and that any pretended divorce between
the parties was a nullity.
Principal authority for this proposition is to be found
in the Restatement of Judgments, Section 42: "Where in
two successive actions between the same parties inconsistent judgments are rendered, the judgment in the second
action is controlling in a third action between the parties."
In the Croyle situation, the a vinculo divorce case was the
first action, the District a mensa case was the second, and
the instant original bill was the third. Certainly, the grant
of a mensa divorce to the first Mrs. Croyle in the second
case in the District was inconsistent with the grant of a
vinculo to him in the -first case; it determined the first
divorce to have been a nullity; and, therefore, it predominates to reach that conclusion in the third case, brought
to have the fact of the nullity of the first case properly
entered on the records.
Case authority for this proposition is to be found at
the level of the Supreme Court of the United States in a
case much like this one, in that the first and third cases
were in one jurisdiction and the second one in another.
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This was the case of Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co.,"
where, in the first case in the State of Washington, the
Washington probate court determined that it did have
jurisdiction after contest to that effect. Then, in the second
case in Idaho the Idaho court later (although perhaps improperly as a matter of full faith and credit to the Washington ruling) determined that the Washington court had
not had jurisdiction. On appeal from the third case in the
Federal court for Washington, the Supreme Court ruled
that Washington, in that case, would have to give full
faith and credit to Idaho's determination that Washington had not, in the first case, had jurisdiction in the premises.
One possible objection to the applicability of the "later
judgment" rule in this case would be that, while Mr. Croyle
might have been bound by the District adjudication had
he lived, yet the now defendant, the second wife, not having been a party to it, is not bound. But it would be hard
to imagine a more appropriate situation than is involved
here for applying the rule that a judgment binds those in
privity with the losing party. Here, the now defendant
succeds to the interests of Mr. Croyle either as widow,
devisee, heir, or administratrix, as the case may be. The
provisions of Restatement of Judgments, Section 89, covering one who, "after the beginning of an action, succeeds
to the interest of one of the parties * * *" are in point, insofar as any contention might be made that the now defendant is less bound by the judgment than would have
been Mr. Croyle had he survived.
Furthermore, even if there were no such privity between the now defendant and the husband, the rule of Restatement of Judgments, Section 74, might dictate the conclusion that she is bound, nevertheless. This provides, in
part (1), that "in a proceeding in rem with respect to a
status the judgment is conclusive upon all persons as to the
existence of the status."6 But, part (2) is more specific
to the effect that such a judgment "is not conclusive as to
a fact upon which the judgment is based except between
308 U. S. 66 (1939).
0 Per contra, consider I AuSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (Campbell,
Ed. 1874) 274, n. where Mr. Campbell, the Editor, observes in one of his
footnotes: "It may be observed as a principle of general jurisprudence
that a judgment or decree in an action of status (like every other judgment or decree) is conclusive only between the parties to the action in
which it is pronounced, and persons in privity with them." At this point
Mr. Campbell had been discussing the fact that the "Legitimacy Declaration Act, 1858" was self-limited in its effect to parties to the action and
their privies.
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persons who have actually litigated the question of the
existence of the fact." This last phase would, thus, return us to the question of the second wife's privity if the
"fact" of the fraud, rather than the continuance of the
"status" be the salient feature of the District judgment.
But, it might be argued, the now plaintiff is as much seeking to set up her status as erstwhile continuing wife, as the
fact of the fraud in the divorce. Perhaps, however, were
she proceeding in the Orphan's Court, the status aspect of
the District proceeding would loom larger, whereas when
she proceeds on this original bill the fact aspect is the
important one.
Another possible obstacle to the District judgment's
being entitled to full faith and credit as having determined
the invalidity of the Maryland decree would be the argument that the District of Columbia court exceeded its jurisdiction in making a finding that the Maryland decree had
been obtained by fraud. This would entail the idea that
it was only proper to litigate that in the Maryland court
where the divorce was obtained, on a direct attack such as
was ultimately brought,7 and that such a defect (unlike
lack of jurisdictional domicil) was not a proper subject
of the apparently collateral attack that was allowed in the
District court. The import of this would then be that it
is not necessary for Maryland to give full faith and credit
to that aspect of the District judgment wherein the rendering court exceeded its jurisdiction.
But, the answer to that, in support of necessary full
faith and credit, is that (correctly or otherwise) the District court did find that it had jurisdiction to inquire into
the fraudulent nature of the Maryland divorce and, he not
having appealed on that ground, Mr. Croyle and his privies
are bound by the determination that the District court
possessed jurisdiction to inquire into the fraud. Restatement of Judgments, Section 10, supports this idea, with
the caveat that a consideration of policy against permitting
a court to act beyond its jurisdiction may outweigh the res
adjudicata effect of its finding that it did have jurisdiction.
It is hard to see any consideration of policy in this situation sufficient to outweigh the secondary res adjudicata
aspect of the District judgment, to the effect that the court
did have jurisdiction to make a finding that there was fraud
in Maryland.
7 Quaere: May an original bill for fraud to strike a divorce decree once
granted be brought elsewhere than in the State and in the very court
where it was originally entered?
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It is arguable that, had Mr. Croyle pressed the point
in the District court and had he appealed the grant of a
limited divorce, he might have had the proceeding dismissed on the ground that the District had to give full
faith and credit to the Maryland divorce as long as it stood
unrevoked on the books of the Maryland court. But, not
having appealed, the implication of Section 10 of the Restatement is that he is bound by the (possibly erroneous)
finding that the District court had jurisdiction to look into
the fraud just as much as he became bound by the finding
about the fraud, whether right or wrong, when made by
a court which had jurisdiction so to find, whether it had
it as of right or because of his mistakenly allowing it to
assert it to his disfavor.
The point remains, therefore, that because Mr. Croyle
did not contest the jurisdictional power of the District
Court, he became bound by its finding where, had he so
contested, he might have forced his first wife immediately
to go to the Maryland courts on original bill, as a condition
precedent to her obtaining a District award of alimony,
just as the Veteran's Bureau ultimately did so force her to
do so as a condition of obtaining an administrative award
of a pension from them.
The final point to be made is that the Veteran's Bureau
was in error in so forcing her to litigate the third case in
Maryland. They, too, should have accepted the later District limited divorce as res adjudicata that she, the first
wife, was widow and so entitled to the pension, rather
than any one else. But they apparently were blinded by
the apparently valid Maryland a vinculo decree, and followed the line of least resistance and forced her to
straighten out the record by the proceeding now under
discussion.
The writer realizes that the law of res adjudicata and
full faith and credit is full of pitfalls for the unwary; and
that there may be flaws in the above generalizations. But,
assuming them all to be accurate, this litigation presents
the kind of comedy of errors that this branch of the law
is given to. We see, in turn, first, the obtention of a divorce
decree by fraud on the defendant; then the District of
Columbia court exceeding its jurisdiction in finding about
the fraud, but achieving a binding judgment- in so doing;
then the Veteran's Bureau failing to apply the proper rule
as to the effect of a judgment, forcing the first wife to an
unnecessary third court proceeding in Maryland; where,
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finally, on appeal the correct result was reached, but for
the wrong reason, after the trial court had declined to
reach the correct result for any reason. Sic gloria transit
mundi!
CLAIM FOR SALVAGE AWARD BY MEMBER OF
CREW OF LIBERTY SHIP
Drevas v. United States, War Shipping Administration,
United States Maritime Service'
Libelant was a member of the crew of the Liberty ship,
Matt W. Ransom, which was carrying munitions bound for
Casablanca on February 25, 1943. The crew numbered
forty-four; the total ship's company was seventy-seven.
On April 11, 1943, the ship was either hit by a submarine
torpedo or struck a mine about eighty miles from Casablanca. A hole 14 by 15 feet was torn in the starboard
bow. The hole filled with water, and the stern rose up
about four feet. The propeller was not out of water and
the deck was above water four or five feet. The ship
settled. The master than ordered all hands into boats, and
the order was obeyed by all. On leaving, the master's
orders were to stand by in the boats. Libelant was in the
master's boat along with several other crew members.
After one half hour the master saw that the ship was no
longer sinking and asked the boat's company if they were
willing to go back and try to bring the ship into port.
The members of four other life boats were not asked to
return to the ship. The ship was safely taken to Casablanca. The crew was paid off and the ship repaired.
Libelant claimed that he was entitled to salvage. The District Court, following a long line of similar and even
stronger cases, found that Drevas was not entitled to such
award.
The problem presented by this case is not a new one,
but it had never before been raised directly in this jurisdiction. The general rule, that a member of a crew cannot ordinarily recover an award for salvage was reiterated
in the Eastern Shore.2 There the question was not, as in
the present case, whether the crew member had been discharged from the service of the ship, or whether the ship
had been abandoned, but whether libelant was a member
of the crew of the particular ship at all. In the Eastern
1

D. C., D. Md., February 9, 1945.
F. (2d) 82, 1926 A. M. C. 899 (D. C., D. Md. 1926).
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